Upcoming talks

  • Logics, Norms, and Reasoning (with Filippo Ferrari)
    GAP.10, 17.–20. September 2018, Cologne [ ext.link ].
2018
  • How can more than one logic be correct?

    46th Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, 18.-20. May 2018, UConn, Storrs, Connecticut [ ext.link ].
  • How can more than one logic be correct?

    2018 Joint Meeting of the South Carolina Society for Philosophy and the North Carolina Philosophical Society, 23.-24. March 2018, Rock Hill, South Carolina
    [ ext.link ].
  • What does it mean for logic(s) to be correct?

    Meeting of the APA Pacific Division, Session of the Pluralisms, Relativisms and Contextualisms Global Research Network, 28.-31. March 2018, San Diego, California  [ ext.link ].
2017
  • Logical Pluralism and the Semantics of Rivalry
    Invited Speakers Series, Department of Philosophy, 1. December 2017, University of Miami [ ext. link ].
  • Rivalry between Logics from a Pluralist Perspective
    Logic and Metaphysics Workshop, 20. November 2017, CUNY Graduate Center, New York [ ext.link ].
  • Rivalry between Logics from a Pluralist Perspective
    UConn Logic Group Colloquium, 27. October 2017, University of Connecticut
    [ ext.link ].
  • Logics, Norms, and Reasoning (presented by Filippo Ferrari)
    The Normativity of Logic Conference, 14.–16. June 2017, Bergen [ ext.link ].
  • Logics, Norms, and Reasoning (with Filippo Ferrari)
    Pluralisms Workshop, 2.–4. March 2017, Bonn [ ext.link ].
  • Pluralismus und Dissens in der Logik
    “Kolloquium Philosophie”, RTWH Aachen, 19. January 2017, Aachen [ ext. link ].
2016
  • Pluralism and the Normativity of Logical Consequence (with Filippo Ferrari)
    “Pluralisms Global Research Network Meeting”, 19.-21. December 2016 Bologna.
  • Opposition and Disagreement among Logics
    “Foundational and Semantic Issues on Disagreement”, 28.-29. October 2016, Bonn
    [ ext.link ].
  • Pluralism, Rivalry, and the Normativity of Logical Consequence
    “Pluralisms Global Research Network Meeting”, 11.-20. June 2016, Seoul.
2015
  • Epistemology and the Plurality of Logics
    1st Cologne/Leuven Epistemology Meeting, 30.-31. October 2015, Cologne
    [ ext.link ].
  • Logical Pluralism and the Argument from Incoherence
    GAP.9, 14.-17. September 2015, Osnabrück [ ext.link ].
  • A surprising consequence of pluralism about logical consequence
    “5th World Congress of Universal Logic”, 25.06.-30. June 2015, Istanbul [ ext.link ].
  • Dissens über Logik und die Frage der Rechtfertigung
    “Epistemischer Relativismus und Dissens”, 15.-17. May 2015, Dresden [ ext.link ].
2014
  • Logical pluralism and consequence(s)
    “Graz Epistemology Workshop”, 20.-21. June 2014, Graz [ ext.link ].
  • Die Vermessung epistemischer Standards
    “Neue Perspektiven in der Erkenntnistheorie II: Epistemische Standards, Ziele und Gründe“”, 23.-25. May 2014, Dresden  [ ext.link ].
2013
  • Iterations of safety
    “Saving Safety? Problems and prospects of safety-based accounts of knowledge”,
    30. September -02. October 2013, Bonn [ ext.link ].
  • Strict invariantism and the variability of knowledge ascriptions
    “Saphir” Workshop, 27. February 2013, Bochum.
2012
  • Strict invariantism and the variability of knowledge ascriptions
    “Knowledge Attributions Workshop”, 03. December 2012, Leuven.
  • “Wissen” im Kontext
    “Kolloquium Philosophie”, RTWH Aachen, 28. November 2012.
  • A presuppositional strict invariantist account of knowledge attributions
    “GAP.8”, 17.-20. September 2012, Konstanz. [ ext.link ].
  • Pragmatische Präsuppositionen & die Angemessenheit von Wissenszuschreibungen
    26. June 2012,
    TU Dresden.
2011
  • How quotation marks what people do with words (with Daniel Gutzmann)
    “SPE 4”, 26. September-1. October 2011, Bochum [ ext.link ].
  • Invariantism and presuppositions
    “34th International Wittgenstein Symposium”, 7.-13. August 2011, Kirchberg am Wechsel.
2006–2010
  • Die Bedeutung(en) von “wissen”
    “Mittelbau-Kolloquium”, University of Göttingen, 16. June 2010 Göttingen.
  • Pragmatische Laxheit und Wissenszuschreibungen
    “geist.wissen.sprache”, 20. November 2009, Erlangen.
  • How quotation marks what people do with words (with Daniel Gutzmann)
    “GAP.7”, 16. September 2009 Bremen [ ext.link ].
  • Assertability or truth-values? Prospects for pragmatic invariantism
    “GAP.7”, 15. September 2009 Bremen [ ext.link ].
  • Die Semantik von Wissenszuschreibungen
    “Ringvorlesung Philosophie”, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, 15. July 2009.
  • Nichtwissen und Fairness. Menschenbilder und ihre Methodik in John Rawls’ Theorie der Gerechtigkeit
    “Menschenbilder. Ringvorlesung der Fachschaft Philosophie 08.09”, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, 17. December 2008.
  • “Quotation marks”. A matter of what people do with words (with Daniel Gutzmann)
    “ICQM2”, 16.-18. October 2008, ZAS Berlin.
  • Wissen im kontext? Zwei semantische Ansätze zur Kontextabhängigkeit von “wissen”
    “XXI. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie (DGPhil)”, 15.-19. September 2008 Universität Duisburg-Essen [ ext.link ].
  • Scepticism, hinge propositions, and common ground
    “31st International Wittgenstein Symposium”, 10.-16. August 2008, Kirchberg am Wechsel.
  • Multifunctionalism via minimalism. A radical pragmatic account of quotation (with Daniel Gutzmann)
    “ICQM”, 19.-21. October 2007, Mainz.
  • Verwendungsweisen von Zitaten und ihre theoretische Erfassung
    “Zitat und Bedeutung”, 29.-30.September 2006, Mainz.

Comments

  • Comment on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s “Availability, goodness and argument structure”
    “Reasoning Conference”, 24.-27. July 2014, Konstanz. [ ext.link ]
  • A comment on Thomas Krödel’s “Implicit definitions and the application of logic”
    “New work on the a priori and meta-philosophy”, 14. May 2010 Cologne.
  • In what sense does the “knowledge rule” constitute assertion?
    “Workshop with Timothy Williamson”, 29.-30. January 2010 Cologne.
  • Three levels and a regress? A comment on Quassim Cassam’s “The possibility of knowledge”
    “4th Mainz-Frankfurt Kolloquium”, 11. January 2008 Frankfurt.
  • Reflective epistemic luck and the challenge of radical scepticism. A comment on Duncan Pritchard’s “Epistemic Luck”
    “3rd Mainz-Frankfurt Kolloquium”, 23. March 2007 Mainz.